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BRINGING ABOUT THE NORMATIVE PAST
Alessandra Tanesini
When discussing normative matters of 
law, meaning, and justifi cation we can fi nd 
ourselves talking in ways which suggest that 
our actions do not only affect the future, they 
can also affect the past. Judges and lawyers, 
who debate the fairness of ex post facto law, 
assume that legislation can have retroactive 
effect. Interpreters of older texts are often 
conscious of the ways in which later readers 
impose meanings on the pronouncements 
of earlier writers. Similarly, because assess-
ments of whether our beliefs are justifi ed 
depend on contextual standards, we are quite 
happy to say things which can be plausibly 
taken to imply that future developments af-
fect the justifi cation of past beliefs. Hence, 
we seem to treat justifi cation as having ret-
roactive effects. These considerations show 
that we do not fi nd it immediately absurd to 
think that, in the realm of normative matters, 
what comes later can contribute to the deter-
mination of the normative status of what has 
come earlier.
The contrast with non-normative discourse 
is stark. The idea that one could do something 
now that determines the facts of what hap-
pened yesterday strikes the ordinary person as 
patently absurd. What happened, happened, 
and nothing in the future can make a differ-
ence to that.1 It seems natural to think that the 
present cannot causally infl uence the past.2 
Ordinary descriptive ways of talking simply 
refl ect this idea that the facts about the past 
are fi xed and that they cannot be infl uenced 
now, although we may, of course, wish that 
they had been different.3
This paper is fi rst concerned with a variety 
of cases where, it is argued, our ordinary ways 
of speaking show that we take the present and 
future to contribute to the constitution of the 
normative features of the past. Section 1 of-
fers some legal examples which are relatively 
uncontroversial. Subsequently, sections 2 and 
3 present some more controversial examples 
concerning meaning and justifi cation.
Section 4 describes some features of our 
linguistic and epistemic practices in light 
of the examples presented in the fi rst three 
sections of the paper. It is argued that these 
practices exhibit what can be described as a 
“whiggish” temporality.4 Some of the norms 
by which these practices are governed have 
contents that are partly determined by what 
happens in the future.5 Sections 5, 6, and 7 
offer arguments detailing some good reasons 
why our linguistic and epistemic practices 
should exhibit this kind of temporality. In par-
ticular, given human fallibility and ignorance, 
it is rational to treat our assertions and beliefs 
as the sort of things which are vulnerable to 
objections by future members of the linguistic 
192  / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
community. Further, given the requirement 
that legal, epistemic, conceptual and linguis-
tic norms be determinate, the acknowledge-
ment of future normative judgements implies 
that some of the norms by which our practices 
are currently governed have contents which 
are partly determined by future developments 
of the practices themselves.
1. The Retroactive Effect of Laws
There are at least two clear ways in which 
laws can have retroactive effects. First, some 
laws are “ex post facto.” Second, laws that 
repeal other pieces of legislation can cancel 
out their authority altogether, so that they no 
longer apply even to situations that took place 
before they were repealed.
An “ex post facto” law is defi ned as a law 
which “makes an action a crime even though 
it was not a crime when it was committed,” 
or increases penalties for crimes after they 
were committed, or changes with retroactive 
effect the rules of evidence, thus making it 
easier to convict a person.6 The Constitution 
of the United States prohibits both the fed-
eral government and State legislators from 
passing ex post facto criminal laws (Article 
1, Sections 9 and 10). British Law does not 
include a prohibition of this sort, and the 1991 
War Crimes Act is the only modern example 
of a ex post facto criminal law passed by the 
legislative body of a democratic country. 
Since legislators have thought it necessary to 
prohibit ex post facto laws, they have clearly 
assumed that such laws are possible.
Besides ex post facto laws and laws that 
repeal other laws, case law, sometimes la-
belled judge-made law, also have retroactive 
effects. Thus, Jerome Hall writes that case 
laws are capable of extending backward in 
time, and placing “the authoritative stamp 
of criminality upon the prior conduct.”7 This 
manner of speaking is strongly suggestive of 
the idea that laws passed at a later date can 
determine the legal status of prior behaviour. 
The retroactive power of case laws and ordi-
nances could be seen as a consequence of the 
open-texture of their formulations. H. L. A. 
Hart, who developed the idea, presents the 
example of an ordinance prohibiting the use 
of vehicles in a public park. The formulation 
of the ordinance is open-textured because it 
is not clear whether it applies to, say, skate-
boards, bicycles, electric wheelchairs, or even 
electrically powered toy cars. The lack of 
clarity is not a problem unless for whatever 
reasons the issue of its application is raised. 
In such an instance there is room for discre-
tion.8 Nevertheless, once the decision has 
been made, it clarifi es the initial meaning of 
the ordinance in question, and therefore, is 
seen as applying to past cases also.
In many of these cases there is more than 
one way in which the law could be clarifi ed. 
For example, if gangs of youths on bicycles 
have become a real nuisance in parks, it might 
be decided that the ordinance prohibiting the 
use of vehicles in parks applies to bicycles. 
Alternatively, if children use bicycles in parks 
without damaging them or unduly disturb-
ing other users, even though the question is 
raised by a particularly grumpy individual, 
it might be decided that bicycles do not 
count as vehicles for the purposes of the 
ordinance. In either case, it is plausible for 
the legislators to claim to have been faithful 
to the intentions with which the ordinance 
was originally drafted. In both instances, 
they could make a claim for having clarifi ed 
rather than modifi ed the ordinance. Thus, in 
the fi rst scenario legislators could say that the 
ordinance always applied to bicycles, in the 
second they could say that it never applied to 
them. In either case the so-called clarifi cation 
has retroactive effect.
In conclusion, in the realm of the law, it is 
commonly thought to be possible for a piece 
of legislation to have retroactive effects.
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2. The Retroactive Effect of 
Meaning Attributions
When we read the works of authors, who 
have written in the past using what we con-
sider to be the same language as ourselves, we 
normally take them to use their word-forms9 
with the same meanings they have when we 
use them. There are, of course, exceptions. 
We are aware that some words have under-
gone dramatic changes in their meanings.10 
But, generally, unless we have reasons to 
believe that a change in meaning has taken 
place, we take the words of our predecessors 
at face value, so to speak. Similarly, we also 
usually take them to have used these words 
to refer to the same kinds of things which we 
use these words to refer to now.
When we read about marine life in old 
books, we take the word “fi sh” to have had 
the same linguistic meaning at the time as it 
has for us now. We believe this despite being 
fully aware that for a long time people used 
the word “fi sh” in sentences such as “whales 
are fi sh.” When we read about a past speaker’s 
utterance of a token of this sentence we are 
not usually tempted to apply the principle 
of charity, and to take the writer to express 
something true by means of this utterance. 
On the contrary, unless we have reasons to 
believe otherwise, we simply assume that 
the past speaker uses the word “fi sh” with 
the meaning and extension we attribute to 
it. We simply take the utterance to be false, 
because we take the word “fi sh” as used in the 
past to be true of something if and only if the 
word “fi sh” as used by us is true of it. That 
is, we take the past uses of “fi sh” to be true 
of something if and only if that something is 
a fi sh. In other words, we readily interpret 
cases such as this one as an instance of belief 
revision rather than meaning change.11
Linguistic use, however, could have de-
veloped otherwise. It is not impossible that 
once our ancestors discovered that whales are 
mammals, they could have opted to use the 
word “fi sh” to apply to all creatures, with a 
backbone and fi ns, living exclusively in water. 
Had this usage been adopted, we would still 
be happy to assert sentences such as “whales 
are fi sh.” In our mouths, of course, this sen-
tence would mean that whales are creatures 
with a backbone and fi ns living exclusively 
in water. Had linguistic practice developed 
in this alternative way, the word “fi sh” would 
have a different meaning and extension from 
that it actually has.
These considerations, however, quickly 
give rise to a dilemma. The actual case has 
been described as one in which the word 
“fi sh” has not changed its meaning or exten-
sion. However, if we consider the hypotheti-
cal scenario, we realise that in that case also 
speakers would describe the development of 
their practice as an instance of belief revi-
sion rather than meaning change. In that 
instance, they would express their discovery 
by stating sentences such as “some fi sh are 
mammals.”
Considerations of symmetry suggest that 
their attitude is justifi ed. In either the actual 
or hypothetical case, when contemporary 
speakers put themselves in the shoes of 
their ancestors, they do not need to learn a 
new concept or meaning which those past 
speakers associated with their word “fi sh.” 
In either case, rather than learning something 
new, contemporary speakers must pretend 
to have forgotten some facts. They need to 
imagine that they do not know that whales are 
mammals. In other words, the development 
of the linguistic practice in either scenario is 
best explained in terms of the acquisition of 
a new piece of knowledge which has induced 
rational revisions of some previously held 
beliefs. The meanings of the words used have 
undergone no change.12
We appear to have ended up with a problem. 
Both in the actual and hypothetical scenario 
contemporary speakers read their ancestors 
as having used their words with the same 
meanings as they use theirs. They both seem 
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warranted in taking this attitude. However, the 
meanings so attributed certainly seem differ-
ent from each other. Thus, the word as used 
in the past must have had a different meaning 
in each of the two scenarios.
It might be objected that the example pre-
sented above is far too vague to support this 
conclusion. In particular it has not been estab-
lished that there are no differences between 
the dispositions of the speakers in the two 
scenarios which would explain their divergent 
decisions with regard to the correct use of the 
word “fi sh.” However, there are examples 
such as a thought experiment fi rst presented 
by Mark Wilson, which have the same struc-
ture as the case presented above, and can be 
used to show that differences in past disposi-
tions to behave play no explanatory role in 
the phenomenon highlighted here.13
Wilson asks us to imagine a colony of 
Druids, speaking an archaic version of Eng-
lish, and inhabiting an isolated island. One 
day the Druids see an aeroplane landing on 
their island. The aeroplane is the fi rst fl ying 
thing, apart from the local avian population, 
the Druids have seen.14 After the encounter, 
Druids use their word “bird” to refer to birds, 
planes, helicopters and so forth, whilst adopt-
ing the expression “feathered bird” to refer to 
birds. Call this scenario: A.
We can equally imagine that the aeroplane 
crashed on the island, and that none of the 
Druids witnessed the event. The Druids 
later meet the survivors of the crash camp-
ing around the hulk of the plane. After this 
encounter, Druids use the expression “house” 
to refer to houses and planes, and they adopt 
the expression “flying house” to refer to 
aeroplanes. The Druid word “bird” in this 
second scenario is applied to birds but not 
planes. Call this scenario: B.
In this thought experiment we are meant to 
think that provided that we describe the Dru-
ids’ disposition to behave in terms that make 
no reference to the future, their dispositions 
are the same in both scenarios; their behav-
iour develops differently simply because of 
the differences between their respective fi rst 
encounters with an aeroplane.
This thought experiment, and the other 
example discussed above, present the same 
puzzle. It seems natural to say that before the 
encounter with the fi rst aeroplane, Druids 
in both scenarios A and B meant the same 
thing by the word “bird” (“house”); after 
all, there is no difference in their pasts or 
presents. There is no doubt, however, that 
contemporary Druids in A and B mean differ-
ent things by “bird” (“house”). Were each of 
them to entertain the possibility of the other, 
they would readily agree that the Druid in B 
who utters the words “it is not the case that 
aeroplanes are birds” does not contradict 
the Druid in A who utters the words “aero-
planes are birds.”15 There is no contradiction 
because their words “bird” (“house”) do not 
have the same meaning; they express differ-
ent concepts. However, both in A and in B 
Druids would resist the claim that upon the 
encounter with the plane, they have changed 
the meanings of their word “bird” or of their 
word “house.” In either case they would say 
that the concepts they already possessed 
guided in A their classifi cation of aeroplanes 
as birds, and in B as houses (and therefore 
not as birds). But if both groups of Druids are 
right to think that they have not changed the 
meanings of their words since the encounter 
with aeroplanes, since the meanings of their 
words are now different, they must have been 
different in the past also.
This conclusion is of course controversial 
and it is not conclusively established by these 
examples alone. The point of the examples is 
to suggest that one way of making sense of 
some features of ordinary linguistic practice 
is to treat meaning attributions as having 
retroactive effect.
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3. The Retroactive Effect of 
Justifications
We often treat justifi cations as being sensi-
tive to context. The same grounds that in one 
context provide suffi cient grounds for a belief 
are not suffi cient in a different context. Fur-
ther, the difference between the contexts need 
not concern the existence of other evidence 
relevant to these grounds. The difference 
could be exclusively a matter of the relative 
importance of getting things right. In some 
cases, a change in future context contributes 
to the determination of whether or not we 
were justifi ed in holding a belief in the past.
Imagine that I intend to travel from London 
to Cardiff in the early evening. I possess a 
copy of the published timetable, and I check 
it. I notice that there is a train scheduled to 
depart from London Paddington to Cardiff 
Central at 5:00 p.m. Thus, I form the belief 
that there is a train at 5:00 p.m. that will 
take me to Cardiff. In these circumstances, 
I would be prepared to say that my belief is 
justifi ed.
Now imagine that I remember that I have 
made an arrangement to have dinner with a 
friend in Cardiff that evening, and that it is 
crucial that I am there on time. Being in Car-
diff before 8:00 p.m. has suddenly become 
quite important to me. At this point, being 
well aware that the British railway system is 
not as effi cient as it should be, and knowing 
that they do cancel trains, I feel less certain 
that there is a train scheduled to depart 
London to Cardiff at 5:00. Hence, I call the 
information line for confi rmation. Further, 
depending on how important it is to be in 
Cardiff for this dinner, I might even mistrust 
the information provided by the information 
service, since they are renowned for getting 
things wrong quite often, and decide to take 
an earlier train in order to make sure that I 
am in Cardiff on time.
The change of context has contributed to 
determining the epistemic status of my past 
belief. Once the time of arrival becomes 
important, I do not take myself to have been 
justifi ed when I formed my belief simply on 
the basis of the timetable. In other words, I 
do not say that the belief was justifi ed when 
it was formed, but subsequently became 
unjustifi ed. Rather I think that the belief was 
unjustifi ed all along. But clearly I take this 
attitude only because at a later stage it became 
quite important to rule out the possibility of 
cancellations. The new context has raised 
the threshold for justifi cation, so that the old 
belief is now shown to have always fallen 
short of it.
However, even in Britain, it is appropriate in 
ordinary circumstances to take the published 
timetable as providing adequate grounds for 
forming beliefs about train departures. Thus, 
had I remembered about the dinner engage-
ment only when I was already travelling on 
5:00 hour train to Cardiff, I would not have 
said that I went to Paddington station not 
knowing whether there was a train at 5:00; 
after all, I had checked the timetable. Thus, 
what makes these two scenarios different is 
the development subsequent to the formation 
of the belief. The intervening circumstances 
contribute to the determination of the past be-
lief as either justifi ed or unjustifi ed. Thus, the 
determination takes place retroactively.16
We can show retroactively that some be-
liefs have always been unjustifi ed, but we 
can also show in the same way that beliefs 
have always had justifi cation. Thus, I might 
give much importance to a deadline for the 
submission of a document, and think that the 
deadline is, say the 1st of March, because I 
vaguely remember reading something to that 
effect. In this case, I will seek to gain fi rmer 
evidence about the precise deadline. But sup-
pose I learn instead that the deadline is very 
fl exible. In such a case, I shall not go through 
the trouble of trying to chase the matter up. 
Instead, I tell myself that my memory is pretty 
good, and thus re-evaluate my grounds for 
belief, as being, in the circumstances, good 
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enough. I now come to see myself as having 
been justifi ed all along.
Discovering that the deadline was fl exible 
did not provide grounds for or against it 
falling on 1 March. Thus, the subsequent de-
velopment is not one in which new evidence 
relevant to the belief is uncovered. Rather, 
the new development, by determining the 
threshold of justifi cation, makes it the case 
that the belief was already justifi ed. But, it 
gained such a justifi cation retroactively.17
4. The Whiggish Temporality of 
Our Practices
The previous sections have presented 
examples from the realms of law, meaning 
and justifi cation, and offered arguments that 
in all of these cases our ordinary practices 
seem to permit a determination of the nor-
mative features of the past by present and 
future developments. These examples share 
some common features. First, they all present 
branching scenarios. Second, the branching 
always takes place when some combination 
of accidental and unforeseeable events has 
as a consequence a change in the range of 
alternatives that become relevant, and forces 
a novel assessment of the situation at hand. 
Third, although the future normative assess-
ments made about the past in each scenario 
are mutually incompatible, nevertheless they 
both appear to be correct.
This section provides an argument based 
on the branching examples discussed above 
for the conclusion that that ordinary linguistic 
and epistemic practices exhibit a whiggish 
temporality. They are governed by norms 
whose contents are partly determined by 
the future developments of these practices. 
The argument proceeds in two stages: fi rst, 
evidence is offered for the conclusion that, 
contrary to appearances, the two branches in 
branching scenarios do not share the same 
normative past; second, reasons are given for 
the claim that given the privileged epistemic 
status of ordinary judgements about same-
ness (or difference) of normative status, the 
best explanation for this past divergence in 
branching scenarios, is that the future plays 
a role in the constitution of its past and pres-
ent.
The fi rst stage of the argument begins by 
considering four incompatible theses concern-
ing our hypothetical branching examples:
1. The normative status of an instance or 
occurrence of X before the branching took 
place is the same in both scenarios A and 
B.
2. After branching the normative status 
of an instance or occurrence of X in A is 
not the same as the normative status of an 
instance or occurrence of X in B.
3. The normative status of instances or oc-
currences of X in A is the same before and 
after branching.
4. The normative status of instances or oc-
currences of X in B is the same before and 
after branching.
In these theses X stands for a type of thing, 
like a word, an action, or a belief, whose in-
stances are the bearers of normative statuses. 
Thus, if X is the word “fi sh,” and its normative 
status is its meaning, the four theses would 
respectively claim that the past meaning of 
instances of the word in both scenarios is the 
same, that present meanings differ, that in the 
fi rst scenario the meaning has not undergone 
changes, and that in second scenario the 
meaning has not undergone a change either.
These theses seem all true. Yet, they are 
incompatible, because the negation of 1 is 
entailed by 2, 3, and 4 given the transitiv-
ity of identity. The truth of 2 is, however, 
in every example totally uncontroversial;18 
hence, there only remain four ways to avoid 
inconsistency. The fi rst is to deny thesis 3, 
the second is to deny thesis 4, the third is to 
deny both theses 3 and 4, the fourth is to deny 
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thesis 1. In what follows the adoption of this 
fi nal option is defended.
For reasons of symmetry neither of the fi rst 
two options offers a viable solution. The same 
sort of considerations that can be offered in 
favour of or against 3 can also be used to 
support or undermine 4.19 Hence, the only 
genuinely viable solutions to this problem are 
the third and fourth which treat both scenarios 
in the same way.
Supporters of the third option could defend 
their view by claiming that in either scenario 
the intentions of past individual members of 
the community settled what they meant by 
the words, and the range of application of 
their legislation. Since their intentions about 
what to do in the unforeseeable cases that 
brought about the branching were somewhat 
nebulous, they differ from the intentions of 
individuals in either scenario after the branch-
ing has taken place. Thus, it makes sense to 
conclude that in both instances normative 
statuses have undergone a change.20
The argument has little plausibility with 
regard to legal examples where although it 
might be granted that the intentions of the 
initial legislators might have been somewhat 
nebulous on some matters, it is thought that 
the task of successive judges is to clarify what 
the law has always prescribed (permitted). 
The argument has more plausibility with 
regard to examples concerning meaning, but 
it is ultimately unconvincing in those cases 
also.21
The intentions of past speakers, as they 
would formulate them, do not determine the 
meanings (and references) of their expres-
sions. To see this, consider the following 
example. Those who coined the word “jade” 
might have done so with the intention of nam-
ing a natural kind.22 However, in 1863 Alexis 
Damour discovered that the word “jade” was 
used to name samples of two distinct minerals 
which are now known as “jadeite” and “neph-
rite.” If the intentions of those who introduced 
the word determined its meaning and its 
reference, we should conclude that Damour 
discovered that “jade” did not refer. But we 
are not at all tempted by this conclusion. 
Instead, we say that Damour discovered that 
jade is not a natural kind.23 Examples such 
as this one undermine the idea that present 
intentions alone determine present meaning. 
Hence, the argument offered by supporters of 
the third option is not convincing.
There is a further consideration which 
undermines the third solution to the problem 
of the incompatibility of the four theses men-
tioned above. This solution presupposes that 
in both scenarios words have changed their 
meanings, laws their range of application, 
and beliefs their epistemic statuses. How-
ever, this conclusion is inconsistent with the 
sort of descriptions of the relevant practices 
which the practitioners themselves could be 
expected to provide.
For example the Druids in scenario A could 
point out that when they write about the his-
tory of their community, they describe the 
past before they saw the fi rst plane as a time 
when it was unknown that some birds are 
not living entities. In other words, in their 
view, they put themselves in the shoes of 
their ancestors by pretending ignorance, not 
by thinking of them as employing a different 
concept.24
In conclusion, if we want to be faithful to 
ordinary linguistic and epistemic practices, 
the incompatibility among the four theses 
listed above is best solved by denying the 
fi rst thesis. In other words, we must conclude 
that scenarios A and B in each example do 
not have a shared normative past.25 Rather, 
the past in the two scenarios is always dif-
ferent.
It might be objected that, contrary to what 
has been claimed, this solution is not faithful 
to our ordinary practices since the idea that 
the two branches of a branching scenario do 
not share a normative past clashes with our 
intuitions about these cases. The existence 
of this clash cannot be denied. However, the 
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objection relies on a confl ation between our 
folk beliefs about our ordinary practices and 
the features of the practices themselves. The 
proposed solution aims to make sense of some 
features of our linguistic, legal and epistemic 
practices, and in this respect it is superior to 
the other available options. It does clash with 
some folk beliefs about our practices, but 
this is not a problem since the folk theories 
to which such beliefs belong should not be 
granted any special epistemic privilege.
The next stage in the argument for the claim 
that our linguistic and epistemic practices 
exhibit a whiggish temporality consists in 
showing that the two branches in each ex-
ample could have different pasts only if future 
developments partly constitute the normative 
features of the past and present. This section 
of the argument relies on the observation 
that in our linguistic and epistemic practices 
judgements of sameness of normative status 
within a community across time have a kind 
of default status. That is, unless we have 
reasons to the contrary, we implicitly and 
explicitly take past utterances to have the 
same meaning that current utterances of the 
same words would have, past applications of a 
law to carry the same set of commitments and 
responsibilities associated with current ap-
plications of the law, and past beliefs to have 
the same epistemic status as current beliefs 
with the same content and based on the same 
evidence. It is argued that the default status of 
these judgements of sameness of normative 
status is a consequence of their constitutive 
role in determining the normative statuses of 
the words, actions or beliefs the judgements 
are about. Hence, the future developments 
of a practice partly determine the normative 
features of its past.
The expression “judgement of sameness or 
difference of normative status” is used here 
to include the implicit judgements people 
ordinarily make when they treat each other’s 
words at face value, since to do so is implic-
itly to judge that others are using their words 
with meanings that are the same as those one 
attributes to those words. These judgements 
have a privileged epistemic status of being 
justifi ed by default.
Our attitudes to the utterances of other 
people and to inscriptions in texts illustrate 
this point. Unless there is something unusual 
about the situation, we simply take these 
words at face value. This is what we do when 
we listen to people and we read books. Of 
course, if in a particular instance this attitude 
leads to attributing to the other person or to 
the book’s author patently false or absurd 
views, we will consider whether they used 
their words with unusual meanings. Thus, 
taking others’ words at face value is part of 
our ordinary linguistic practice. Implicitly, we 
think of ourselves as entitled to attribute to 
words as used by others the same meanings 
those words have for us without needing any 
specifi c evidence for this attribution. In other 
words, we think of ourselves as entitled to 
these judgements by default.
Similarly, we attribute by default the same 
epistemic status to beliefs with the same 
content based on the same evidence. If I take 
myself to be justifi ed in believing something 
on the basis of specifi c reasons, I take those 
reasons to provide other people also with a 
justifi cation for the same belief. Otherwise, 
it would seem that the reasons in question 
are not genuine justifi catory reasons. Thus, 
I am by default justifi ed in believing that if 
you hold the same views as I do, and for the 
same reasons I have, our beliefs have the 
same epistemic status. There are cases in 
which such judgements of sameness would 
be mistaken. But typically we are entitled 
to take them to be correct unless we have 
reasons to believe otherwise. Legal cases ex-
hibit the same feature. We attribute by default 
the same legal status to actions of the same 
kind. There might, of course, be problems 
with settling what counts as being actions of 
the same kind, but the general point stands. 
We are entitled to assume by default that the 
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law gives the same verdict on all relevantly 
similar cases.26
To say that judgements of sameness of 
normative status have a default status is not of 
course to say that no such judgements could 
be mistaken. Clearly, they can. We might take 
a word as appearing in an old book to have 
the same meaning we attribute to it, and dis-
cover that we are mistaken. The point rather 
is that we are entitled to assume that they are 
correct unless we have grounds for suspicion. 
We could say that these judgements are not 
vulnerable to bare challenges.27 It would not, 
for example, be appropriate to challenge my 
assumption that the word “fi sh” as used in an 
old book means fi sh, by merely asking “how 
do you know?” Instead, in order to challenge 
my assumption, you need to provide some 
reason for thinking that the word was used 
with a different meaning.
Judgements of sameness of normative sta-
tus, it has been argued, have the special epis-
temic status of being justifi ed by default. This 
is a fact which requires some explanation. We 
need to fi nd out why these judgements are 
epistemically privileged. The best explana-
tion for the special epistemic role possessed 
by practical judgements of sameness (and 
difference) of normative status is that at least 
some of these judgements play a role in the 
constitution of the normative statuses them-
selves. If judgements that two uses of a word, 
applications of a law, instances of a belief 
have the same normative status contribute to 
the constitution of the statuses themselves, it 
would be no surprise that the judgements are 
justifi ed by default.
The claim that these judgements have a 
constitutive role which explains their epis-
temically privileged status is based on the 
thought that we have no grasp of what counts 
as two words, actions or beliefs having the 
same (or a different normative) status inde-
pendently of the judgements that they do.28 
We do not have any idea of what it is for a 
word to have a given meaning independently 
of the fact that it has been used with that same 
meaning in a variety of occasions. And we 
have no idea of what it is for a word to have 
been used with same meaning on a variety 
of occasions independently of judgements 
that it has been used in this way. Again, this 
is not to deny that these judgements could be 
mistaken. Rather, the point is that our grip on 
the notion of the meaning of an expression 
depends on our grip on the idea that the ex-
pression is used with the same or a different 
meaning in different occasions, and our grip 
on this second idea depends on our judge-
ments of sameness and difference.
More specifi cally, any attempt to ascertain 
whether one word has been used with the 
same meaning on a variety of occasions 
will ultimately terminate with taking some 
judgements made by some speakers about the 
meaning of that word, or of other words, at 
face value. Ultimately, there is no other court 
of appeal. This last point is most obvious in 
legal examples where not much sense can be 
made of the idea of legal status independently 
of the judges’ judgements when making deci-
sions about the application of laws.
To summarise the argument, it has been 
concluded that the future developments of 
our linguistic and epistemic practice con-
tribute to determining their normative pasts. 
This conclusion has been derived from a fi rst 
argument which shows that in the so-called 
branching scenarios, the two branches have 
different pasts. Given the observation that our 
judgements of sameness of normative status 
are justifi ed by default, the best explanation 
for differences with regard to the past is that 
the different futures constitute what their 
respective pasts have always been.
Two clarifi cations are in order at this point. 
Firstly, it is not the view proposed here that 
in the realm of the normative the future can 
change the past. Rather, the point is that the 
future contributes to the determination of 
what the past has always been. Thus, for 
example, the future cannot change the mean-
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ings of the words as they have been used in 
the past. But, what those words in those uses 
have always meant is not something that is 
fully determinate independently of the future 
developments of linguistic practice.29
Secondly, although in the argument pre-
sented in this section the role of future judge-
ments in the constitution of the normative past 
has been singled out for emphasis, a variety 
of other factors could play such a constitutive 
role in different practices. Thus, for example, 
in some practices the mere formulation of 
some future judgements could contribute to 
the constitution of the past, in other practices 
only future judgements to which one is genu-
inely entitled may play a constitutive role. 
A taxonomy of all these different factors is 
beyond the scope of this paper.30
Having made a case for the claim that the 
normative future contributes to the constitu-
tion of the normative past, in what follows it 
is argued that there are good reasons why our 
practices exhibit a whiggish temporality. The 
argument is based on considerations concern-
ing two factors relevant to our practices. The 
fi rst is human fallibility and the fact that we 
often operate in conditions of ignorance. This 
factor makes it necessary that formulations of 
the law, actual uses of language and attribu-
tions of justifi cation be open-textured. The 
second is a consequence of the requirement 
that our norms be determinate. The next three 
sections present an argument that open-tex-
ture and determinacy can be combined only 
within a context of a practice which allows for 
the normative future to constitute its past.
5. The Determinacy of Norms
In this section the view that legal, epis-
temic, conceptual or linguistic norms must 
be precise—that is, fully determinate—is 
defended. Also, it is assumed that norms or 
rules are the sort of thing that can be dropped 
or adopted but which is not in itself subject to 
changes. There is no doubt that we commonly 
talk of rule changes, but all such talk is best 
read to mean that we have changed which 
rules we choose to apply. Rules themselves 
do not change, but we can abandon a rule 
in favour of the adoption of a new one. For 
example, when FIFA changed the rule for 
off-side in soccer, they dropped the old rule 
and introduced a new one.
There are two dimensions to the determi-
nacy of norms. Norms can be determinate 
both with regard to their range of application 
and to the verdict they issue in each applica-
tion. Norms are fully determinate or precise 
if and only if they are both application-deter-
minate and verdict-determinate.31 A norm is 
application-determinate if and only if there 
is no indeterminacy as to whether it applies 
to any given case. It is verdict-determinate if 
and only if there is no indeterminacy about 
the verdict issued by the norm in each specifi c 
case to which it applies. Of course, many 
norms do not apply to every case. So, for 
instance, the rules of soccer do not apply to 
games of chess. An application-determinate 
norm is not one that applies to every case; it 
is a norm whose range of application is deter-
minate. The norm is also verdict-determinate 
if its verdict is equally determinate.
Legal norms are both application and ver-
dict determinate. If they were not, we would 
have to admit that in some instances there is 
no fact of the matter as to whether some ac-
tion is legal or illegal. Such a state of affairs 
would clearly not be acceptable. For this 
reason, we require that our laws are both ap-
plication and verdict determinate. Of course, 
we can acknowledge that in some situations 
we are unclear about what the law permits or 
prohibits. However, these are cases in which 
we are ignorant about the precise nature of 
the law. They are not cases in which the law 
is actually indeterminate.
Determinacy is also a feature of norms gov-
erning the meaning of linguistic expressions. 
If these norms were not fully determinate, 
there would be cases in which there is no fact 
of the matter as to whether the norm applies 
BRINGING ABOUT THE NORMATIVE PAST / 201
or what its verdict is. In these circumstances 
the norm would fail to provide a determinate 
meaning for the expression it governs. Thus, 
for example, no meaning has been supplied 
for the expression “frabble” if we are only 
told that it does not apply to fi sh, but it does 
apply to philosophers. Instead, if an expres-
sion is to count as a predicate, it must be gov-
erned by a norm which determines whether 
or not it applies to any object whatsoever.32 
Again, this is not to deny that in many cases 
we might not know whether the norm applies 
to the situation, or which verdict it issues. To 
say that the norm itself is fully determinate 
is not to say that we are always able to dis-
criminate the situations to which it applies 
from those to which it does not.
Finally, determinacy is a feature of those 
epistemic norms governing the practice of 
asking and offering reasons for our beliefs. 
These norms prohibit inconsistencies, they 
require that we offer reasons for our views, if 
they have been appropriately challenged, they 
permit ignoring some remote possibilities, 
and so forth. If these norms were indetermi-
nate there would be instances in which they 
would offer no guidance in reasoning.
It has been argued so far that our legal, 
conceptual and epistemic norms be precise 
or fully determinate. Arguably, all genuine 
norms must be precise in this way. This 
claim is not defended here, nevertheless it is 
worth pointing out that what might seem to 
be obvious counterexamples to this view are 
not ultimately convincing. There are norms 
which seem to be application-indeterminate. 
Consider, for example, the off-side rule in 
soccer. It appears indeterminate whether 
or not it applies to games of soccer played 
by children in parks. There seems to be no 
fact of the matter as to whether any specifi c 
children’s game is governed by this rule. 
Thus, the off-side rule would be application-
indeterminate.33
This conclusion seems plausible only if we 
ignore that such games are played for recre-
ational purposes. Once it is kept in mind that 
children play these games for the sheer fun 
of it, it is apparent that in these games it does 
not really matter much whether or not some 
of the rules are transgressed. Thus, it is quite 
plausible to think that all the rules apply to 
these games unless the children have implic-
itly or explicitly decided not to acknowledge 
them. We mistake for indeterminacy the lack 
of sanctions against transgressions which 
originate in the purely recreational purposes 
of these games.
6. Open-Texture: What it Is and 
Why it Is Necessary
Our legal, linguistic and epistemic prac-
tices are characterised by the phenomenon of 
“open-texture.” This section provides an argu-
ment that “open-texture” is a consequence of 
our fallibility, and that it is a feature of our 
normative attitudes, rather than of the norms 
themselves.
Waismann, who fi rst introduced the idea 
of open-texture, argues that our empirical 
terms or concepts are open-textured because 
they “are not delimited in all possible direc-
tions.”34 He further adds that when a concept 
is introduced, we defi ne it so as to limit its 
application “in some directions.” But, “there 
are always other directions in which the con-
cept has not been defi ned.”35 He illustrates the 
point by presenting the example of a thing 
that purrs like a cat, and looks like a cat, but 
has grown to a gigantic size. Waismann notes 
that we would be unsure as to whether it was a 
cat, and hence whether the term “cat” applies 
to it. The possibility that such a creature might 
exist has not been considered when providing 
a defi nition of “cat.”
In the context of the law H. L. A. Hart has 
adopted Waismann’s idea of open-texture and 
applied it to legal formulations. Thus, Hart 
interprets the example presented above of 
the ordinance prohibiting the use of vehicles 
in the park as an example of the open-tex-
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ture of the law. Open-texture is for Hart a 
positive feature of legislation. He points out 
that, even if it were possible, it would not be 
advisable to avoid open-texture when drafting 
legislation. A piece of legislation lacking the 
fl exibility which open-texture permits will 
without doubt lead to bad consequences. Hart 
notes that we could freeze the defi nitions of 
words in a rule of law, but in this manner we 
would only secure predictability at the cost 
of settling in the dark “issues which can only 
reasonably be settled when they arise and are 
identifi ed.”36
Waismann and Hart might have had dif-
ferent conception of open-texture, but there 
is a common core to their view. For Hart, a 
formulation of a law is open-textured when 
we have not settled whether or not it ap-
plies to a range of cases. The reliance on 
open-texture makes it possible to endorse 
a formulation which might express any of 
a variety of rules of law without having to 
settle on endorsing a specifi c one of them. 
Thus, open-texture could be described as a 
feature of our structure of normative attitudes. 
It involves acknowledging one rule or norm 
through the adoption of a formulation that 
expresses it whilst acknowledging that one 
has no other way of precisely determining 
the nature of that norm.37
Hart makes a convincing case that for many 
ordinances and other pieces of legislation it 
would be very ill-advised to try to settle in 
the dark which among a variety of rules that 
only differ with regard to yet unexplored 
circumstances we wish to endorse. The open-
textured formulation of the law allows us to 
suspend judgement on this matter without 
thereby failing to acknowledge the law which 
will turn out to have been the one expressed 
by the open-textured formulation among 
the many that that formulation was equally 
capable of expressing.
Waismann’s talk of defi nitions associated 
with open-textured terms can be understood 
along similar lines. For Waismann, a term 
is open-textured if it has a defi nition which 
does not delimit some features of its use. 
These defi nitions are nothing but explicit 
formulations of what we take to be the rules 
governing the use of the term.38 By endors-
ing incomplete defi nitions we avoid having 
to settle in advance and in the dark about 
relevant empirical matters which norms 
among many possible candidates govern 
our use of the empirical terms and constitute 
our concepts. The open-texture of language 
allows us to acknowledge the rule which, 
when the empirical evidence is in, will turn 
out to have governed our use of the term all 
along, without having to be able to single out 
that rule now.
Open-texture is also a feature of our 
epistemic practice. We often put forward 
statements to which we take ourselves to be 
entitled without having to settle in advance 
which alternatives will be relevant in any 
given context and must be ruled out in order 
to gain entitlement to that claim. Instead, by 
putting forward the claim one acknowledges 
one’s responsibility to provide a justifi cation 
that satisfi es the appropriate standards what-
ever those standards turn out to have been, 
independently of whether one could now spell 
out what these standards are.
It is no surprise that our linguistic and 
epistemic practices have this feature. Given 
our ignorance of what the future might bring 
it would be unwise to develop legislation 
which prejudges our decisions while being in 
the dark about the relevant facts. Similarly, it 
would seem foolish to use terms in ways that 
settle what we are to say of cases about whose 
details we are as of yet ignorant. It appears 
equally rash to decide in advance the required 
standards for justifi cation before we know 
anything about the contexts within which 
novel justifi cations might be required.
7. The Rationality of Whiggishness
The argument that given our fallibility and 
ignorance, and the determinacy of the norms 
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governing our practices we would expect 
these practices to exhibit a whiggish tem-
porality if they are to be capable of rational 
revision and development is quite simple.39 It 
would be pure dogmatism, if given our falli-
bility we were not to treat our assertions as be-
ing vulnerable to criticism by future members 
of our community. Such an attitude would 
prevent any progress. We would be unable 
to learn from previous errors. Consequently, 
it is rational to take our views to be open to 
future emendation and correction.
It is equally rational, given our ignorance, 
not to try to settle once and for all and in the 
dark which determinate norms should govern 
our legal, linguistic, and epistemic practices. 
Instead, we grant future members of our 
community, who might be less ignorant than 
we presently are, the authority to contribute 
to the determination of which norms always 
governed the practices of the community. In 
light of the constitutive role of at least some 
judgements of sameness and difference of 
normative status (as discussed in section 4 
above) and of the requirement that norms 
be determinate, deferrals to future authority 
entitle future practitioners to determine the 
norms that already govern current practice. 
And this is the rational thing to do, for fi nite 
creatures like us, whose practices are always 
subject to emendation and correction.
Cardiff University
NOTES
Earlier versions of this paper were read at the Central Division of the APA and at the Welsh Philosophi-
cal Society. I am indebted to audiences on both occasions for several helpful comments. My greatest 
debt is to Mark Lance and Henry Jackman whose comments on earlier versions forced me to clarify 
my views.
1. As Michael Dummett noted there is an exception to this attitude. We seem to be able to make sense 
of the idea of praying to God, asking him to have spared a loved one. Despite this exception, the general 
point still stands. Cf. Dummett, “Bringing About the Past,” in Truth And Other Enigmas (Cambridge 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 333–350.
2. There are philosophers who defend the coherence of the notion of backward causation, and nothing 
said here rules out the possibility that they might be right. After all, even Huw Price—a supporter of 
the idea of backward causation—claims that “it is true… that from our perspective, we can’t affect 
our past.” See Time’s Arrow and Archimedes’ Point. New Directions for the Physics of Time (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 167.
3. Thus, sense can be made of the idea that the past could have been different. What we cannot make 
sense of is the idea of changing the past so that what has been is now changed so as not to have been.
4. The label was used in a pejorative sense by Herbert Butterfi eld in The Whig Interpretation of History 
(London: G. Bell & Sons, 1959).
5. The view that normative practices have a structure of this kind has been discussed by supporters 
of temporal externalism. See for example, Henry Jackman, “We Live Forwards but Understand Back-
wards: Linguistic Practices and Future Behavior,” Pacifi c Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 80 (1999), pp. 
157–177. Similar views have also been addressed by Mark Lance in “The Word Made Flesh: Toward 
a Neo-Sellarsian View of Concepts, Analysis, and Understanding,” Acta Analytica, vol. 15 (2000), pp. 
117–135.
6. John J. Patrick, Richard M. Pious, and Donald A. Richie, “Ex Post Facto Law,” The Oxford Guide 
to the United States Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Oxford Reference Online, 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/Entry.html?subview=Main&entry=t89.e325, accessed 9 Feb-
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ruary 2004. This defi nition seems to be, strictly speaking, incoherent, since if it is true that the action 
was not a crime when it was committed, then it is not a crime full-stop. But it is clear that the thought 
behind this defi nition is that the law passed at a later date makes the earlier action a crime.
7. Jerome Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960), p. 
61.
8. H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), pp. 121–127.
9. The expression “word-form” is used to indicate a sign irrespective of its semantic features. Thus, 
concatenations of the letters “f,” “i,” “s,” and “h” are instances of the word-form “fi sh.” Hereafter, 
“word” is used as a shorthand of “word-form.”
10. “Objective” is an example. In the early modern period this adjective was said to pertain to that 
which is mind-dependent. Currently, it has a meaning which implies mind-independency.
11. It might be objected that this phenomenon can be explained by the fact that “fi sh” was originally 
introduced as a natural kind term. This would be a mistake. Exactly the same phenomenon occurs 
when we consider terms which do not purport to stand for natural kinds. A good example is presented 
by Mark Lance and John Hawthorne when they consider the possibility that our practices might have 
developed so that the term “wedding” was reserved only for what we think of as “religious wedding” 
while a new term such as “joining” was introduced to cover what we call “civil weddings.” In either 
case, practitioners would think of their notion of wedding as being faithful to the original conception. 
See Mark Norris Lance and John Hawthorne, “From a Normative Point of View,” Pacifi c Philosophical 
Quarterly, vol. 71 (1990), pp. 28–46, esp. p. 34. It is plausible that if legislation permitting gay mar-
riage is eventually put on the statute books, it will eventually be treated as spelling out what marriage 
has always meant.
12. Ordinary linguistic practice is being described here. Some philosophers of language might wish to 
hold that any change in belief results in meaning change of the words involved. What matters here is that 
our linguistic practice does not connect talk of meaning and belief in this manner. Instead, ordinarily 
when we say that we have changed our views, we would deny that we have thereby also changed the 
meanings of our words.
13. Mark Wilson, “Predicate Meets Property,” The Philosophical Review, vol. 91, no. 4 (1982), pp. 
549–589.
14. Imagine that there are no insects on the island.
15. For the same reason the utterance of “aeroplanes are houses” by Druids in B does not contradict 
the utterance of “it is not the case that aeroplanes are houses” by Druids in A.
16. In these examples, although future developments do not provide evidence for or against a belief, 
they nevertheless contribute to determining its epistemic status. When future developments bring to the 
fore new evidence, the epistemic statuses of beliefs can obviously change. In these cases, the epistemic 
statuses of beliefs might not be constituted retroactively, but rather undergo a change over time.
17. Contextualists typically draw a different lesson from examples of this sort. In their view these beliefs 
do not acquire or lose their justifi cation retroactively; rather, in these cases beliefs possess justifi cation-
relative-to-S1 and lack justifi cation-relative-to-S2, where S1 and S2 refer to two different standards. 
This strategy is not plausible but an argument for this claim cannot be offered in this paper. Suffi ce to 
say that if epistemic statuses were indexed to context in this way we would need to keep track of these 
indexes in argumentation. But this is not what we do, in a given context we treat claims as prima facie 
or all things considered justifi ed, we do not treat them as justifi ed relative to a specifi c context.
18. With regard to the linguistic examples, reasons for this claim have been provided in sect. 2 
above.
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19. Reasons for this claim have been offered in sect. 2 above when describing the Druids example. The 
same kind of considerations can be readily applied to all other examples.
20. This argument has been developed by Jessica Brown for examples concerning linguistic meaning. 
See “Against Temporal Externalism,” Analysis, vol. 60, no. 2 (2000), pp. 178–188.
21. The argument has no application to the epistemic examples of branching.
22. Alternatively, one could say they might have intended to name the stuff or stuffs of which some 
specifi c samples were made. But now suppose that all the original samples were made of one of the 
two materials, jadeite for instance. At a subsequent time, however, the term is used also in the presence 
of nephrite samples. Finally, it is discovered that jadeite and nephrite are two distinct minerals. In this 
instance also, what is discovered is that jade is not a natural kind. But if original intentions determined 
meaning, this case would be one in which what was discovered is that “jade” had been systematically 
misapplied to nephrite.
23. This example is discussed by Tom Stoneham in “Temporal Externalism,” Philosophical Papers, 
vol. 32, no. 1 (2003), pp. 97–107, esp. pp. 97–98.
24. A similar point is made by Wilson, “Predicate Meets Property,” p. 586. Considerations in favor 
of this claim have been offered in sect. 2 above. A similar point can be made with regard to the legal 
examples.
25. Physically speaking they clearly share the same past, but this fact is no impediment to thinking that 
the normative features of this past could be different in the two cases. In itself this is possible even if 
the normative supervenes on the physical provided the supervenience is global.
26. The privileged epistemic status of these normative judgements offers further reasons in favour of 
thinking that theses 3 and 4 presented above are true. Hence, this consideration offers further ammuni-
tion for the view that thesis 1 is false.
27. This terminology was fi rst introduced by J. L. Austin “Other Minds, Part II,” Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, supplementary vol. 20 (1946), pp. 148–187.
28. This idea has been developed by Gary Ebbs but also in a different guise by Lance and Hawthorne 
that we have no grasp of the notion of sameness of normative status independently of our practical 
judgements of sameness of normative status across time. Gary Ebbs, “The Very Idea of Sameness of 
Extension across Time,” American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 37, no. 3 (2000), pp. 245–268; and 
Lance and Hawthorne, “From a Normative Point of View.”
29. This claim does not imply that meanings are currently indeterminate. Instead, the meaning could 
now be determinate even though what determine it are the normative features of future claims, actions 
or institutions.
30. The idea that different practices might differ in which aspects of the future contribute to the con-
stitution of its past has been pressed by Mark Lance.
31. This terminology has been suggested to me by Mark Lance.
32. In effect, it is claimed that all conceptual vagueness is a matter of ignorance. This view has been 
defended by Timothy Williamson, Vagueness (London: Routledge, 1996), chap. 7.
33. Mark Lance has pressed this point in conversation.
34. Friedrich Waismann, “Verifi ability,” in Logic and Language (First Series), ed. and with an intr. by 
Antony Flew (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963), pp. 117–144, esp. p. 120.
35. Ibid., p. 120
36. Hart, The Concept of Law, p. 126.
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37. Similarly one can acknowledge the truth of some propositions—e.g., those constituting the general 
theory of relativity—without being able to spell out what they are. Instead, one can rely on the truth 
predicate, and claim that the general theory of relativity is true.
38. For Waismann, “[a] term is defi ned when the sort of situation is described in which it is to be used,” 
“Verifi ability,” p. 122.
39. The idea that accepting that norms are fully determinate forces one to adopt the view that the future 
plays a role in the constitution of the normative past has been discussed by Henry Jackman in “Temporal 
Externalism and Epistemic Theories of Vagueness,” Philosophical Studies, vol. 117, nos. 1–2 (2004), 
pp. 79–94.
